Welcome to the desert of the real: reality, realism, measurement, and C-OAR-SE by Nick Lee (2946171) & John Cadogan (1255026)
European Journal of Marketing
 
 
 
 
 
 
WELCOME TO THE DESERT OF THE REAL: REALITY, 
REALISM, MEASUREMENT, AND C-OAR-SE 
 
 
Journal: European Journal of Marketing 
Manuscript ID EJM-10-2016-0549 
Manuscript Type: Original Article 
Keywords: Psychometrics, Realism, Measurement, Validity 
  
 
 
European Journal of Marketing
European Journal of Marketing
 
WELCOME TO THE DESERT OF THE REAL: REALITY, REALISM, 
MEASUREMENT, AND C-OAR-SE 
 
 
Nick Lee  
Professor of Marketing 
Warwick Business School 
Warwick University 
 
 
 
John Cadogan 
Professor of Marketing 
School of Business and Economics 
Loughborough University 
 
And 
 
Professor of Marketing 
LUT School of Business and Management 
Lappeenranta University of Technology 
Finland 
 
 
  
Page 1 of 20 European Journal of Marketing
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
European Journal of Marketing
Abstract:  
Purpose – This article provides a balanced commentary on Rossiter’s paper ‘How to 
use C-OAR-SE to design optimal standard measures’ in this issue of the ‘European 
Journal of Marketing’. It also relates the comments in general to Rossiter’s other C-
OAR-SE work, and throws light on a number of key measurement issues that seem 
under-appreciated at present in marketing and business research. 
Design/methodology approach – We use conceptual argument based on 
measurement theory and philosophy of science. 
Findings – We find that Rossiter’s work makes a number of important points that are 
necessary in the current stage of development of marketing and social science. 
However, we also find that many of these points are also well made by fundamental 
measurement theories. When measurement theory is correctly interpreted, the idea of 
multiple measures of the same thing is ot problematic. However, we show that 
existing social science measurement practice rarely takes account of the important 
issues at play here. 
Practical implications – We show that marketing, management, and social science 
researchers need to get better in terms of their appreciation of measurement theory, 
and in their practices of measurement. 
Originality/value – We identify a number of areas where marketing and social 
science measurement can be improved, taking account of the important aspects of C-
OAR-SE, and incorporating them in good practice, without needlessly avoiding 
existing good practices. 
 
Keywords Psychometrics; Realism; Measurement; Validity 
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Introduction 
For almost two decades, we have enjoyed various jousts with John Rossiter over 
measurement issues, and particularly his C-OAR-SE theory / method. We read early 
drafts of the paper that was eventually published in the International Journal of 
Research in Marketing (Rossiter, 2002), we delivered opposing presentations on 
measurement in special conference sessions (e.g. the European Marketing Academy 
2005) and have also written commentaries on C-OAR-SE (e.g. Rigdon et al., 2011, 
and this present comment). We’ve relished informal discussions during conference 
sessions, and over drinks later on, as well as debates over email on occasion. Through 
it all has been John’s constant challenge to improve our measurement practices in 
marketing and wider social sciences. Whether or not C-OAR-SE has been 
significantly impactful on the practice of marketing measurement (and Rossiter in this 
issue implies not), it is hard to deny the impact it has had on driving those who, like 
us, take a specific interest in measurement, to sharpen their own theories and methods, 
even if the purpose of which was sometimes to more strongly rebut Rossiter’s 
arguments. 
 
Our goal in this present comment is to place Rossiter’s (2016) article in the European 
Journal of Marketing – which we will refer to as JR2016 – in a broader context of 
what we term metaphysical measurement theory
1
. In doing so, we will clarify the 
areas where the principles outlined in C-OAR-SE continue to have the potential to 
make a positive impact on scholarly practice. One of our primary goals is to explore 
                                                
1
 We use this term to refer to a measurement theory that specifically focuses on questions concerning 
the fundamental structure of the world. Such issues include ontological questions about the identity, 
and reality, of the things we try to measure (especially unobservables), as well as causality. We would 
consider ‘empirical measurement theory’ by contrast to primarily be concerned with the modeling of 
empirical data. While both are important, it strikes us that most existing social science measurement 
theory concerns itself much more with the latter than the former. 
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the areas where JR2016, and other C-OAR-SE theoretical work, identifies important 
symptomatic problems in our current practice, but at the same time does not diagnose 
the fundamental underlying conditions responsible for those symptoms. In such cases, 
C-OAR-SE on occasion prescribes remedies that may only go part way towards 
curing the problem. In particular, as we shall show here, many aspects of C-OAR-SE 
present what really should be good practice in existing measurement theory, in new 
and complex ways, which may be behind Rossiter’s lament that C-OAR-SE is seen as 
a ‘seemingly too difficult measure-design method’ (JR2016 PPno). We suggest some 
simplifications and clarifications that may enhance the take-up of the strong 
fundamental principles Rossiter has long advocated in C-OAR-SE. 
 
Our mainly metaphysical focus means that we leave many of the more specific 
empirical and analytic aspects of JR2016 to our fellow commenters, and focus our 
attention on a single theme of JR2016, namely that there are too many “different, 
even slightly different, measures of the same construct” and, worse, that there is no 
guarantee that the use of different measures will not “produce different findings” (pp 
XX). We strongly agree with JR2016 that the multiple measures issue is in current 
practice a serious problem. However, our view is that this is a symptom of a much 
more serious underlying problem in social measurement practice, that of the general 
lack of convincing definitions of what the unobservable attributes (which are 
represented by constructs in social theories) being measured actually are, and whether 
they exist or not. This problem is compounded by weak theories about how these 
attributes are connected to their measuring devices. Below, we place a number of 
JR2016’s recommendations in context with these key foundations. 
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Multiple Constructs, Multiple Measures … Multiple Realities?  
Rossiter has long been concerned about the seemingly ever-growing variety of 
measures created and utilized across different studies, which purport to ‘measure’ the 
same construct (e.g. Rossiter, 2002, 2011). In JR2016, he uses the well-known 
construct of ‘market orientation’, among others, to illustrate this point, although we 
could point out a seemingly endless variety of others. We cannot do anything other 
than agree with Rossiter here. For too long, the social sciences have all contributed to 
an ever-growing menagerie of ‘constructs’, each then often ‘measured’ using multiple 
different operationalizations. This is by no means limited to management and 
marketing, and even a cursory search of literature in fields such as psychology, 
education, sociology, and suchlike will show multitudes of different constructs, many 
offering slight variations on an already-existing theme, or even giving the same name 
to a different definition, let alone the manifold different measures of ostensibly the 
same construct. 
 
Time and time again, we see the reasoning behind such a situation based on 
something called ‘classical test theory’, ‘latent construct / variable theory’, the 
‘domain sampling model’, or ‘psychometric theory’. However, there seem to be a 
number of quite significant inconsistencies between a) what various scholars mean by 
these terms, b) what they actually do in practice, and c) what the relevant underlying 
measurement theory really is. Therefore at this point it is necessary to clarify some 
terms, to avoid confusion. In particular, the word attribute in C-OAR-SE is used to 
refer to only one part of a construct definition, and oftentimes, multiple attributes 
(which Rossiter terms ‘subattributes’) are combined in one construct definition. This 
seems to contradict most ideas of measurement (see Markus and Borsboom, 2013 for 
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an excellent overview), and instead implies that C-OAR-SE is a method to develop 
abstract composites, rather than measure actual features of the real world.  
 
If indeed C-OAR-SE is intended to be a composite construction theory, it is of little 
use to think of it as a measurement theory (Edwards, 2011; Markus and Borsboom, 
2013; Cadogan, Lee, and Chamberlain, 2013), and to subject it to scrutiny as such. 
However, we are relatively certain that Rossiter views C-OAR-SE as a measurement 
theory, given the copious references to measurement throughout C-OAR-SE papers. 
If so, we must be clear about what measurement itself actually is. We are not able to 
do more here than briefly sketch the issues, and hence for simplicity’s sake we follow 
Markus and Borsboom (2013) in using the term causal theory of measurement, which 
seems to be a “widely accepted set of assumptions among researchers” (Markus and 
Borsboom, 2013, pp. 84) regarding their activities when engaged in measurement 
practice. A causal theory of measurement (CTM) takes the constructs in measurement 
models to “refer to common causes (equivalently, attributes; Rozeboom, 1966) that 
underlie a set of item responses, so that people respond to items differently because 
they have a different construct score” (Markus and Borsboom, 2013, pp. 81-82). 
 
As such, constructs are simply components of a scientific theory, which themselves 
have no existence, because a theory itself is simply an abstract representation. 
However, in a CTM, we must remember that constructs are designed to be referent 
devices which stand in for actual attributes of the real world we are studying. In other 
words, one does not measure a construct, one measures an attribute. This distinction 
shall prove critical to the following discussion, and is tentatively expressed in Figure 
1a, which connects measurement theory with actual empirical practice. Importantly 
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Figure 1a avoids conflation of purely theoretical and purely empirical / mathematical 
terms (constructs and empirical scores) with actual features of the real world 
(attributes and measures). Such problematic intermingling is encoded in typical 
measurement model visualizations (see for example Figure 1b), and seems likely to 
have led to a number of unfortunate consequences for actual social measurement 
thought and practice. 
 
FIGURE 1a and 1b. 
 
The idea of a CTM is likely to seem so self-evident as to be almost trivial to many 
readers – after all, without ‘something’ to measure, how can we measure? However, 
encoded in the seemingly simple idea are a number of very powerful assumptions (as 
expressed in Figure 1a), which closer a alysis of actual social science practice (more 
aligned with Figure 1b) will show to lack convincing support, leading to the 
symptoms Rossiter, in JR2016 and elsewhere, identifies (Rigdon 2016 also touches on 
similar issues, albeit for a slightly different purpose). Unfortunately, at times C-OAR-
SE also falls into similar conceptual traps, even as it identifies important problems in 
current practice. We cannot address them all here, but the most critical issue concerns 
the nature of the attribute one is trying to measure. More specifically, are attributes 
real? A CTM seems to require the assumption that attributes being measured are real, 
otherwise, how could they exist, how could they have causal impacts on other 
attributes, and indeed how could they therefore be measured? Social scientists face 
the extremely difficult problem that most of the attributes they are interested in are 
unobservable (i.e. not detectable by the unaided human senses), and are therefore not 
subject to direct confirmation of their existence. However, social science is hardly 
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alone in this, and even modern physics faces similar hurdles, such as (to use the terms 
of the present discussion for simplicity’s sake) measuring the attributes of subatomic 
particles (e.g. electron spin) and suchlike.  
 
A common response to this problem is to appeal to a realist philosophy, where 
unobserved attributes in scientific theories are considered to actually exist, as part of a 
mind-indep ndent world that is investigated by the sciences (Chakravartty, 2015, see 
for example Borsboom, Mellenbergh, and Van Heerden, 2003), which would seem 
superficially to settle the issue. However, this sort of ‘blanket realist’ approach does 
not itself survive much scrutiny, and leaves a number of questions without 
satisfactory answers. One fundamental question concerns how we can reconcile a 
scientific realism with the fact that numerous unobservable attributes and entities have 
been debunked as science has progressed, which is termed the pessimistic induction 
objection (Chakravartty, 2015). If for example the phlogistication of air is no longer 
viably real, why are we confident that the market orientation of a firm, or even 
individual differences such as personality traits (or for that matter, unobservable 
physical attributes such as electron spin), are real? In other words, given that the 
reality of all past unobservable attributes that were posited in scientific theories has 
been disproved, by what logic can we consider the attributes referred to by today’s 
scientific theories to be real?  
 
Most importantly in the present context however, a blanket realism seems to admit 
any and all of the attributes we propose to the pantheon of reality. This inevitably 
leads us to anarchy, which is essentially the situation described by JR2016. However, 
where JR2016 appears to problematize the proliferation of different measures, we 
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would instead argue that the real issue is a seemingly unstoppable propagation of 
different constructs, many of which have the same name, even though they seem to 
refer to different attributes, which themselves are only weakly defined. Market 
orientation, for example, had multiple construct definitions almost as soon as it 
appeared in the literature (e.g. Kohli and Jaworski, 1990; Narver and Slater, 1990), 
and there have been a seemingly endless variety of new definitions in the last quarter-
century. So, what is ‘market orientation’? If it is real, how can there be multiple 
different definitions of it? By basic logic, either there must be a) one thing, which we 
call market orientation b) multiple different things, which should therefore be given 
different names, or c) no thing. What there cannot be is multiple things that are the 
same thing. The multiple measures JR2016 criticizes are a symptom of this absolutely 
vital problem, common to social sciences in general. A science cannot progress – or 
even begin to call itself a science – if it cannot agree on what its fundamental 
attributes are, let alone whether they actually exist.  
 
One Reality, Multiple Measures, No (Necessary) Problem 
If convincing descriptions of fundamental attributes can be provided, the multiple 
measures issue pointed out by JR2016 ceases to be a significant problem. Take the 
attribute of ‘temperature’ for example
2
. Of course, temperature has the advantage of 
being directly observable by our unaided senses, but the principle holds to all real 
                                                
2
 We recognize that we are at risk of oversimplifying the physical complexities of even this basic 
example. However, to clarify, ‘heat’ is the total energy of molecular motion of a given body, whereas 
‘temperature’ is the average energy of molecular motion in that body. Thus, heat depends partly on the 
size of the body, while temperature does not. Therefore, heat can be understood as energy, while 
temperature can be understood as the average energy content of a body. Temperature has a specific and 
well-defined theoretical relationship to heat, but is not the same thing, since two bodies of the same 
substance but different size can have the same temperature but different amounts of heat. We therefore 
refer to ‘temperature’ as an attribute of an object, which can be measured. Importantly, the temperature 
attribute is an existent property of the real world, separate from the scale used to measure it (e.g. 
Celsius, Kelvin). Thus, we abstract away from the less relevant (for our present purposes), although 
interesting, controversies over the definition of temperature, and the creation of viable temperature 
scales and points of reference (e.g. see Chang, 2004). 
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attributes, observable or not. Consider that one can indeed have multiple valid 
temperature measures, such as a simple mercury thermometer, a gas thermometer, an 
infrared thermometer, or even the complex spectral radiance approaches used to 
measure the cosmic background radiation. One assumes that Rossiter does not 
consider this to be problematic in itself. As such, our view is that the basic principle 
of multiple measures of the same thing is not itself problematic, providing that we can 
convincingly argue that we are measuring a real attribute.  
 
Unfortunately, we are a very long way from having a set of convincing descriptions of 
the fundamental attributes that social science in general studies, let alone marketing. 
In this case, multiple measures are a major practical problem, leading to serious 
problems with research comparability, analogous to if a mercury and IR thermometer 
each actually measured different attributes, neither of which we were sure really 
existed, and yet we referred to both as ‘temperature’ measures. In fact, the situation in 
social science may be even worse, because it is surprisingly difficult to even conceive 
of how we could ever come up with strong and convincing descriptions of even the 
most fundamental human attributes, beyond the physical (cf. Nagel 2002). For 
example, do mental experiences such as love, happiness, pleasure, and other things 
we might call ‘feelings’, exist separately from their biological and physical 
manifestations? If we cannot provide supportable arguments for even this, where does 
that leave us in terms of the social attributes referred to by constructs such as power, 
or charisma? And what then becomes of market orientation, service quality, or brand 
equity? Under what criteria do we justify these as ‘real’?  
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Although they are serious, it is outside the scope of this present paper to do more than 
raise these issues, and note that we have seen very little discussion of anything 
beyond a blanket realism in recent social science measurement theory (with the 
notable exception of a brief discussion in Markus and Borsboom, 2013, pp 308-312). 
So, for the purposes of continuing the discussion, let us make the (somewhat heroic) 
assumption that we can indeed provide some convincing descriptions of real 
marketing-relevant attributes, such as, say, attitude towards an advertisement. If we 
are to maintain a convincing measurement theory, we must also then set out a strong 
theory as to how the attribute causes changes in the measuring device. Again, 
temperature is a useful example. There is a clear theory which shows how the 
attribute of temperature of a substance causes some reaction of the measuring device 
(usually based around the kinetic theory, although statistical physics / quantum 
mechanical explanations are also available). If this is the case, again, multiple 
measures per se are not a problem, because it is possible to validate each measuring 
device separately, and convergent validation becomes a mere (and somewhat 
meaningless) support to this. It would after all be rather disturbing if an IR and 
mercury thermometer turned out significantly different results.  
 
Again though, in social sciences like marketing we are a long, long, way from this. 
Unfortunately, the content validity idea, even wrapped up in the ‘construct-to-
measure’ (CtM) terminology JR2016 uses, does not suffice alone. Agreement 
amongst experts that, for example, some questionnaire item ‘should’ measure some 
unobservable property is definitely not equivalent to the theoretical bases for 
temperature measurement (observable), or electron spin (unobservable) for example. 
We recognize that we are setting what some may consider an impossibly high bar for 
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marketing measurement, but our intention is more to show how far we have to go, 
rather than the fact that the destination is unobtainable. Indeed, even something as 
fundamental as temperature measurement was controversial only around 150 years 
ago (Chang, 2004). As such, we certainly agree that comprehensive approaches to 
delineating the theoretical (which is by definition causal) link from the unobservable 
property to the measure (Link a) in Figure 1a) are essential to basic good practice in 
measure development. 
 
We also agree with Rossiter that universal appeal to multi-item convergent 
correlations is not a substitute for a strong causal theory of how an unobservable 
attribute is measured. This is in fact implied in Figure 1a. Convergent validation 
essentially concerns comparison of empirical scores, which Figure 1a shows have no 
direct connection to the unobservable attributes one is trying to measure. If there are 
problems with the other links in the Figure (which is very likely given our current 
state as described above), then comparing empirical scores will be meaningless 
evidence of whether two measures are equivalently valid. Of course, one would 
expect multiple measures of the same thing to be correlated (consider, again, the 
example of temperature), but alone this does not provide convincing evidence of what 
has been measured, or even if anything has been measured at all. Indeed, the value of 
any empirical evidence rests on the strength of the underlying theory that provides the 
hypotheses that are being tested. Where we disagree with Rossiter is that we believe 
any coherent theory of measurement must as a key feature provide strong and 
falsifiable hypotheses about empirical data. Without even the possibility of empirical 
testing, it is hard to consider any theory to be scientific.  
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That said, without a strong theory, any empirical results are essentially meaningless in 
terms of supporting the existence of unobservable properties. The problem we face in 
social science, which is the root cause of the symptoms JR2016 identifies, is that we 
have very little theory of significant strength in social science measurement regarding 
how measures should behave. Appealing to a conditional independence hypothesis 
(i.e. that correlations between multiple items vanish when conditioned on a common 
cause) is about the strongest we can do right now, with more than one so-called 
‘measurement’ theory unable to even do that (see Markus and Borsboom, 2013). 
However, a strong theory should also rule out alternative explanations for the 
observed pattern of empirical data. Current social science measurement theories do 
not do a good job of this, since they are reliant solely on observable correlation in the 
most part, and do little to explain how the purported unobservable property has a 
causal impact on the measurement device(s). As such, multiple alternative 
explanations for the observed data are available. Again, to use temperature as the 
example, clear mechanisms are theorized about why different temperature measures 
change in response to changes in the temperature of a substance. This then explains 
why the individual measures would likely be correlated. The correlation itself is not 
taken as evidence temperature exists. Of course, temperature is observable, but 
unobservability itself is not an insurmountable barrier to strong measurement theories. 
If it were, most of modern physics, for example, would be untenable.  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
We understand the intention behind C-OAR-SE, and we fully support it. Indeed, we 
agree that measurement theory in marketing and other social sciences is in a worse 
than parlous state, and without a coherent measurement theory, there can be no 
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science
3
. Claiming that social science is spared this task because it deals with abstract 
and unobservable attributes is no defence, because almost all modern sciences must 
face in one way or another such issues. Social science is not unique in dealing with 
unobservables, even if it does face numerous complex and interrelated challenges. 
Further, we agree with Rossiter that in current practice, the seemingly unstoppable 
propagation of multiple measures with the same name is a serious problem. We also 
have strong support for Rossiter’s efforts, both here in JR2016 and elsewhere, to 
increase recognition that the theoretical description of a measured attribute, and the 
theoretical validation of the measure, are important considerations which are seriously 
under-appreciated at present, and we take many of his C-OAR-SE principles in this 
spirit.  
 
So, why, as Rossiter himself bemoans in JR2016, has C-OAR-SE remained 
stubbornly on the margins of current practice? Our view is that this is because in some 
ways we think C-OAR-SE goes too far in its suggested remedies for the symptoms it 
identifies, analogous to amputating a limb when a bone is broken. Conversely, we 
also think C-OAR-SE does not go far enough in diagnosing the real underlying issues 
which are driving poor practice, analogous to diagnosing a muscle sprain when the 
bone is broken.  
 
In our view, the underlying problem with social science measurement is the at best 
weak, and at worst fundamentally unsound, state of current theorizing about the 
unobservable attributes we are attempting to measure. Following from this is the 
                                                
3 The most famous expression of this view is by Lord Kelvin, who stated “when you can measure what 
you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot 
measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory 
kind: it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the 
stage of science” (Thomson, 1889, pp. 73). 
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preponderance of implausible and even nonsensical measurement operationalizations. 
Sole reliance on convergent validation and correlation, as JR2016 correctly points out, 
is certainly problematic practice in light of these underlying problems, and provides 
little convincing evidence of measurement validity, or even if there is something to 
measure.  
 
However, we cannot agree that a blanket rejection of all empirical testing of measures, 
as Rossiter in JR2016 and elsewhere advocates, is a plausible solution. Even if it were, 
the state of our current knowledge about the social and human behavioral world is 
nowhere near detailed enough to give us the ability to create strong enough theories 
connecting most unobservable attributes of relevance to social science to observable 
measures, in the way done with unobservable physical attributes such as electron spin, 
or even observable attributes such as temperature. We must therefore do the best we 
can, and continue to strive for improvement. Our strong theories must have the 
potential to make clear and falsifiable empirical predictions, otherwise, what are they 
theories of? However, as well as this, they must do better at ruling out alternative 
explanations. Doing so is the job currently of a strong interplay between theoretical 
mechanisms and patterns of empirical observations. Ignoring either one leaves us in a 
highly dangerous state. Rossiter is correct in JR2016 to criticize unqualified reliance 
on observed correlations as evidence of valid measurement. However, replacing this 
with what seems to be an almost totalitarian reliance on expert judgement, as CtM 
validity seems to advocate, seems to us to be equally unreasonable.   
 
To conclude, while C-OAR-SE may not have assumed the dominant place in the 
methodological toolkits of marketing and social scientists that Rossiter hoped, it is 
Page 15 of 20 European Journal of Marketing
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
European Journal of Marketing
undeniable that it has had a significant influence on the development of measurement 
theory itself. This has been recognized through multiple awards, including the 2012 
Jan-Benedict E. M. Steenkamp Award for Long-Term Impact, and the 2011 European 
Journal of Marketing Best Paper Award. However, C-OAR-SE has also played a very 
significant role in bringing an expanded understanding of measure development to 
marketing researchers, and encouraged many to think outside what are often accepted 
as the ‘standard’ approaches to developing a marketing measure. While C-OAR-SE as 
a self-contained theory itself may never become as popularly-used by practicing 
researchers as Rossiter hopes, many of its key principles deserve to be taken seriously. 
We hope this present commentary encourages further development of these principles, 
with the end goal of a fully-realised and robust theory for social science research. We 
are a long way from that at present, but without authors such as Rossiter (and the 
other commenters in this issue), we would be far further away. And to be absolutely 
clear, without measurement, there can be no social science. 
 
  
Page 16 of 20European Journal of Marketing
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
European Journal of Marketing
REFERENCES 
Borsboom, D., Mellenbergh, G.J., & van Heerden,  J. (2003). The Theoretical Status 
of Latent Variables. Psychological Review, 110(2), 203-219. 
Cadogan, J., Lee, N., & Chamberlain L. M. (2013) Formative Variables are Unreal 
Variables: Why the Formative MIMIC Model is Invalid. Academy of Marketing 
Science Review. Vol 3 (1): 38-49. 
Chakravartty, A. (2015) "Scientific Realism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/scientific-realism/>. 
Chang, H. (2004). Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 
Edwards, J. R. (2011). The fallacy of formative measurement. Organizational Research 
Methods, 14 (2), 370–388. 
Kohli, A. K. & Jaworski, B. J. (1990), Market Orientation: The Construct, Research 
Propositions, and Managerial Implications, Journal of Marketing, 54 (April), 1–
18.  
Markus, K.A., & Borsboom, D. (2013). Frontiers of Test Validity Theory. Routledge: 
New York: NY. 
Nagel, T. (2002). Concealment and Exposure: And Other Essays. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, UK. 
Narver, J. C., & Slater, S. F. (1990), The Effect of a Market Orientation on Business 
Profitability, Journal of Marketing, 54 (October), 20–35.  
Rigdon E.E. (2016). Choosing PLS path modeling as analytical method in European 
management research: A realist perspective. European Management Journal 
2016: 1-8 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2016.05.006  
Rigdon, E. E., Preacher, K.J., Lee, N., Howell, R.D., Franke, G.R., & Borsboom, D. 
(2011). Avoiding Measurement Dogma: A Response to Rossiter. European 
Journal of Marketing. Vol 45 (10). 
Rossiter, J.R. (2002). The C-OAR-SE Procedure for Scale Development in Marketing. 
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 19(4), 305-336. 
Rossiter, J.R. (2011).  Marketing measurement revolution: the C-OAR-SE method 
and why it must replace psychometrics.  European Journal of Marketing, 
45(11/12), 1561-1588. 
Rossiter, J.R. (this issue). How to use C-OAR-SE to design optimal standard 
measures. European Journal of Marketing, this issue. 
Rozeboom, W.W. (1966). Scaling theory and the nature of measurement. Synthese, 16, 
170-233. 
Page 17 of 20 European Journal of Marketing
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
European Journal of Marketing
Thomson, W., 1889, “Electrical Units of Measurement”, in Popular Lectures and 
Addresses, vol. 1, London: MacMillan, pp. 73–136. 
 
Page 18 of 20European Journal of Marketing
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
European Journal of Marketing
FIGURE 1a 
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FIGURE 1b 
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